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The increasing popularity of growth control regulations should re-
sult in increased legal challenges to such measures in the future. This
Article focuses on the two chief constitutional theories upon which de-
velopers and landowners likely will pursue such challenges: violations of
the takings clause' and violation of substantive due process.2 It also ex-
plains both the overlapping characteristics and important practical dis-
tinctions between takings and substantive due process claims.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Emergence of Damages as a Remedy for Excessive
Land Use Regulation
The increased availability of monetary damages as a judicial remedy
has dramatically affected land use litigation in the last two decades. Pre-
viously, the doctrine of sovereign immunity3 imposed a major barrier to
recovery in federal courts of damages against local zoning jurisdictions in
* Katherine E. Stone is the managing partner of Freilich, Stone, Leitner & Carlisle, a
Los Angeles based law firm which specializes in the representation of municipal governments
in land use and environmental litigation. Ms. Stone has authored numerous articles on zoning,
coastal planning and constitutional law, and represented numerous California cities and other
public agencies in federal and state court litigation involving citizen initiative measures,
growth control and other land use issues.
** Philip A. Seymour is an associate of Freilich, Stone, Leitner & Carlisle and former
Chief Counsel of the Environmental Defense Center of Santa Barbara, California. Mr. Sey-
mour has represented citizens organizations and public agencies in a variety of environmental
and land use cases in the California trial, appellate and Supreme Courts.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The takings clause provides that "private property [shall not]
be taken for public use, without just compensation." Id.
2. See id. (no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law); id.
amend. XIV, § 1 (same applied to states).
3. The principle of sovereign immunity dictates that the state cannot be sued without its
consent. Ex parte State of New York No. 1, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921).
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many states. Some state courts limited judicial remedies for excessive
regulation to invalidation of confiscatory, irrational or other excessive
land use regulations, or injunctions against enforcement of such regula-
tions.' The availability of a damages remedy is particularly important
because damages likely will be the single greatest deterrent to the imple-
mentation of growth control regulations by local governments.
The Supreme Court struck a major blow to local government immu-
nity in Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York.' In Monell,
the Court held that local government agencies could be liable for dam-
ages under title 42, section 1983 of the United States Code.7 Further,
unlike state governments, municipal and county governments are not
protected by the eleventh amendment' from liability for damages; nor do
state governmental immunities protect local governments from liability
under section 1983. 9 Since Monell, challenges to local zoning and land
use decisions based on allegations of constitutional violations have be-
4. See, eg., HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 519, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 365 (1975) (city immune by statute from damages liability for reduction in property
value from $400,000 to $75,000 caused by rezoning), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976); CAL.
GoV'T CODE §§ 818.2, 818.4 (1980); Carlisle, The Section 1983 Land Use Case: Justice Ste-
vens and the Hunt for the Taking Quark, 16 STETSON L. REv. 565, 565 (1987).
5. See, e-g., Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 816 F.2d 1514, 1517-19 (11th Cir. 1987)
(damages for inverse condemnation not allowed under Florida law); Agins v. Tiburon, 24 Cal.
3d 266, 269-70, 598 P.2d 25, 26, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 373 (1979), aff'd, 477 U.S. 255 (1980)
(only remedy available to aggrieved landowner is invalidation; damages not recoverable); Pres-
bytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 332 n. 20, 787 P.2d 907, 914 n.20 (1980)
("If all excessive regulations require just compensation, rather than, invalidation, land-use de-
cision makers, who adopt regulations in a good faith attempt to prevent a public harm, will
nevertheless be held strictly liable for regulations that result in a taking."); Cheyenne Airport
Bd. v. Rogers, 707 P.2d 717, 730 (Wyo. 1985) (in excessive regulation cases, remedy has gener-
ally been limited to injunction and declaration of unconstitutionality).
6. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
7. Ia at 690-91; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
9. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980). Individual local officials,
however, enjoy considerable personal immunity. Virtually every federal circuit has found local
officials absolutely immune from suits for damages for all actions taken in a legislative capac-
ity. See, eg., Haskell v. Washington Township, 864 F.2d 1266, 1277 (6th Cir. 1988); Aitch-
ison v. Raffiani, 708 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1983); Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943,
952-53 (7th Cir. 1983); Espanola Way Corp. v. Meyerson, 690 F.2d 827, 829 (11th Cir. 1982),
cert denied, 460 U.S. 1039 (1983); Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345, 1349
(9th Cir. 1982); Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1193-94 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982); Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272, 274-80 (4th Cir. 1980); Gorman
Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607, 613-14 (8th Cir. 1980). Officials acting in an exec-
utive capacity enjoy a qualified immunity. See Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300, 1304 (9th
Cir. 1988); Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 577-78 (9th Cir. 1984). This
immunity protects municipal officials from liability for actions other than those which violate
constitutional rights clearly established at the time of the alleged wrongful act. See, e.g., Bass
v. Attardi, 868 F.2d 45, 51 (3d Cir. 1989); Bateson, 857 F.2d at 1304.
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come commonplace in the federal courts. Although plaintiffs have gen-
erally been unsuccessful in such actions,"0 and federal courts have since
erected "imposing barriers" in the form of the ripeness doctrine,11 this
wave of litigation continues to this date.
A second major development occurred when the Supreme Court
held in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Ange-
les,12 that (1) money damages were constitutionally compelled in cases
brought under the takings clause of the fifth amendment,13 and (2) that
local governments could be held liable for "temporary" takings,14 at least
where the landowner was deprived of "all use."15 First English effec-
tively overruled state court precedents which had held that invalidation
of offending regulations rather than payment of monetary damages was a
constitutionally permissible remedy for regulatory takings.16
The latter holding of First English is uniquely important in the con-
text of growth control regulations. While growth control regulations,
virtually by definition, do not preclude development of land permanently,
they often effectively delay potential development for at least some land-
owners. If such delay can be equated to a temporary taking, public agen-
cies implementing community-wide growth control measures may be
exposed to potentially crippling financial liability.
B. The Emergence of Growth Control Regulation
Zoning regulations, since their inception, have sought to regulate
the amount and type of development within communities. 7 "Growth
Control," as used in this Article, denotes regulation of the rate of devel-
opment within a geographical area. Growth control measures may be
employed for two principle purposes: (1) to prevent development and
associated demands on public services from outstripping available re-
sources; and (2) to slow down, if not stop, adverse changes in community
character and "quality of life" which are perceived to result from rapid
urban or suburban development. It is beyond the scope of this Article to
10. Carlisle, supra note 4, at 568 n.14.
11. See, e.g., Hoehne v. County of San Benito, 870 F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1989) (claims
not ripe until final decision regarding use of property has been reached).
12. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
13. Id. at 319.
14. For further discussion of temporary takings, see infra notes 75-83 and accompanying
text.
15. First English, 482 U.S. at 318.
16. See id. at 317-21.
17. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (recognizing
constitutionality of regulating land use by geographical zones).
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discuss all the different types of regulatory schemes which might be de-
scribed as growth control measures. For purposes of this Article, how-
ever, growth control measures may be divided into two broad categories.
Permitting systems, or "classic" growth control regulations, limit growth
by establishing quotas on the number of building permits or other entitle-
ments which may issue in a given year."' Other systems restrict growth
by linking development to the availability of public services and infra-
structure.19 The latter type of system may operate in tandem with com-
munity plans for phased development of required infrastructure, thus
linking the timing of development with the general plan.20
Notwithstanding the intense controversy often spawned by growth
regulations, few published decisions have addressed growth control as we
now know it. Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo,21 perhaps the semi-
nal case on the use of timing as a conscious and systematic mode of land
use regulation, was not decided until 1972. In Ramapo, New York's
highest court upheld a zoning plan which required new subdivisions to be
phased in accordance with the city's long-term capital improvement
plan.22 Although cautioning that permanent restrictions against "natu-
ral" growth would not be well received, the court found no constitutional
or state-law obstacles to linking development to the gradual extension of
necessary infrastructure, even though this might delay development of
some properties as much as eighteen years. 23 Touching on the takings
issue, the court noted that denial of the right to subdivide did not neces-
sarily preclude other reasonable uses of the property.24 Moreover, the
court stated that even if use were denied for the entire eighteen-year du-
ration of the zoning plan, losses inflicted by the ordinances would likely
18. See, e.g., CAMARILLO, CAL., MUN. CODE Ch. 1, §§ 20.04-20.23 (1981), cited in Pardee
Constr. Co. v. City of Camarillo, 37 Cal. 3d 465,470 n.6, 690 P.2d 701,704 n.6, 208 Cal. Rptr.
228, 231 n.6 (1984); Pacifica Corp. v. City of Camarillo, 149 Cal. App. 3d 168, 180-82, 196
Cal. Rptr. 670, 678-79 (1983); SIMI VALLEY, CAL., MUN. CODE Ch. 1, art. 19, § 9-1.1801
(1988); see also SANTA BARBARA CITY CHARTER § 1508 (restricting commercial development
to 3,000,000 square feet over 20 years and providing for annual limits based on approved
square feet of development).
19. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 590, 557
P.2d 473, 476, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 44 (1976) (initiative measure prohibiting issuance of building
permits pending compliance with standards for schools, water and sewage treatment); Golden
v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 381-82, 285 N.E.2d 291, 304, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138,
156, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
20. See, eg., Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d at 382, 285 N.E.2d at 304, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
21. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003
(1972).
22. Id. at 383, 285 N.E.2d at 309, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
23. Id. at 377-78, 382, 285 N.E.2d at 301-02, 308, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 151-52, 155.
24. Id. at 373, 380-81, 285 N.E.2d at 298, 307, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 147, 154.
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be substantially mitigated by increases in property value over the delay
period. 5 Since Ramapo, state courts generally have upheld growth mor-
atoria and other growth control regulations, in principle, against consti-
tutional attacks.26 Many state courts, however, have questioned the
legality of such measures under state law, or have remanded cases for
factual determinations on constitutional issues.27 Federal litigation on
growth control regulations has been limited and unpromising to the op-
ponents of such measures. In Construction Industry Association v. City of
Petaluma,25 the Ninth Circuit flatly rejected a substantive due process
challenge to Petaluma's classic growth control ordinance.29 In
Petaluma, the ordinance fixed housing development to 500 dwelling
units per year.3" Plaintiff argued that the ordinance violated substantive
due process in that it was arbitrary and unreasonable.31 The Ninth Cir-
cuit stated that the federal courts should not be called upon to evaluate
whether legitimate local interests are outweighed by legitimate regional
interests.32 Although it remains the leading federal decision on growth
control regulations, Petaluma does not address the question of whether
such regulations may effect a taking. Such a claim was rejected summa-
rily in Giuliano v. Town of Edgarton,33 which involved a challenge to
regulations limiting subdivisions of large parcels to ten new lots per
year.
34
Federal courts generally decline to find that temporary local devel-
opment moratoria or other development interruptions amount to a tak-
ing of property, at least where the delay is limited in duration and
25. Id. at 380-83, 285 N.E.2d at 306-09, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 153-56.
26. See, e-g., Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976) (city plan which fixed housing development growth rate at
500 dwelling units per year and which required building permits to be divided evenly between
west and east sections of city is reasonable exercise of police power); Dawson Enter. v. Blaine
County, 98 Idaho 606, 567 P.2d 1257 (1977) (denial of rezoning of 12.8-acre parcel from
agricultural and residential to commercial use, even though deprivation of highest and best
use, not a taking); Sturges v. Chilmark, 380 Mass. 246, 402 N.E.2d 1346 (1980) (rate of devel-
opment by-law which limited issuance of building permits to one-tenth of lots in subdivision in
year of enactment, and a further one-tenth in subsequent nine years has rational connection
with permissible public purpose).
27. See, eg., Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (reversed and
remanded to determine if initiative ordinance prohibiting issuance of further residential build-
ing permits unconstitutionally burdened right to migrate to city).
28. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1976).
29. Id. at 908.
30. Id. at 901.
31. I d at 905.
32. Id. at 908.
33. 531 F. Supp. 1076, 1084-85 (D. Mass. 1982).
34. Id. at 1081.
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justified by legitimate planning concerns.3 Neither the higher federal
courts nor the state courts, however, have squarely addressed the ques-
tion of whether long-term growth control regulations may effect a taking.
Consequently, this Article primarily addresses the application of general
legal principles to the specific issue of long-term growth control regula-
tions, with the understanding that the case law has yet to be developed.
II. GROWTH MANAGEMENT LEGISLATION AS A
TAKING OF PROPERTY
The takings clause of the fifth amendment provides that private
property shall not "be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion."36 The fifth amendment applies to "regulatory takings ' 37 - gov-
ernmental actions interfering with property rights to such a degree that
they are deemed tantamount to a taking. How regulatory takings are to
be defined and analyzed, however, remains an evolving area of the law.
The Supreme Court has itself admitted on several occasions that it gener-
ally was unable to develop a "set formula" for determining when justice
and fairness require that an economic injury caused by public action
must be deemed a compensable taking.38 Thus, ascertaining precisely
where the boundary between permissible regulation and takings will be
found in any given case remains a matter of applying general, and often
unclear, principles enunciated in the case law.
To complicate matters, takings challenges are generally classified
into two distinct categories. A "facial" challenge is generally aimed at a
legislative decision or policy, such as the enactment of a zoning ordi-
nance. The second category, an "as applied" challenge, involves the
practical application of an ordinance or other regulation to particular
land. An as applied challenge generally presumes that the landowner has
made some reasonable effort to put the land to economic use and that
effort has been thwarted by the challenged regulatory scheme. These two
types of challenges are discussed separately because significant proce-
35. See, eg., Jackson Court Condominiums v. City of New Orleans, 874 F.2d 1070, 1080-
82 (5th Cir. 1989); Schafer v. City of New Orleans, 743 F.2d 1086, 1090 (5th Cir. 1984); Zilber
v. Town of Moraga, 692 F. Supp. 1195, 1198 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Smoke Rise, Inc. v. Washing-
ton Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 400 F. Supp. 1369, 1382 (D. Md. 1975). But see Lockary v.
Kayfetz, 908 F.2d 543, 548-49 (9th Cir. 1990) (moratorium against new water hook-ups may
violate due process or effect a taking if water shortage is purely pretextual).
36. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
37. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122-28 (1978); Goldblatt
v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592-94 (1962).
38. See, eg., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984); Penn Cent., 438
U.S. at 124.
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dural and substantive differences exist in the way that facial and as ap-
plied challenges are resolved, particularly in the growth control setting.
A. Facial Takings Claims
A facial challenge alleges that a governmental statute, ordinance or
policy in and of itself effects a taking of property. 9 In a facial challenge,
the only issue before the court is "whether the 'mere enactment' of the
[regulation] constitutes a taking."'  The Supreme Court, in Agins v. City
of Tiburon,4 stated the test for a facial taking as follows: "The applica-
tion of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the
ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests.., or
denies an owner economically viable use of his land."'42 Thus, to effect a
taking by its mere enactment, an ordinance must either: (1) be an imper-
issible exercise of the government's police power in that it does not
substantially advance legitimate public interests; or (2) effectively pre-
clude all possible reasonable uses of the land.43 Consequently, where the
ordinance leaves open the possibility of reasonable use a takings chal-
lenge must generally be pursued on an as applied basis, after the land-
owner has made reasonable attempts to develop in compliance with the
regulation. The Supreme Court describes the battle as "uphill" for a
landowner claiming a facial taking. 4
1. The substantial relationship/legitimate public purpose prong
The first prong of the Agins test is, on its face, very similar to that
used in evaluating substantive due process claims, and with that used in
testing the validity of legislative acts generally.4' The standards applica-
ble to substantive due process claims46 also serve as the jumping off point
for takings claims brought under the first prong of the Agins takings
39. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470, 479 (1987).
40. Id.
41. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
42. Id. at 260; accord Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485.
43. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260-61.
44. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 495.
45. See, eg., Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323-32 (1981) (applying rational basis test to
commerce clause, due process and equal protection challenge to Surface Mining and Reclama-
tion Act of 1977); Smithfield Concerned Citizens for Fair Zoning v. Town of Smithfield, 907
F.2d 239, 243 (1990) (court should not set aside public officers' determination in zoning mat-
ters unless their action is irrational exercise of power having no substantial relation to public
health, public morals, public safety, or public welfare); Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster,
881 F.2d 1570, 1577 (11th Cir. 1989) ("zoning regulations will not be declared unconstitu-
tional as violative of substantive due process unless they 'hav[e] no substantial relationship to
the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.' ").
46. See infra notes 132-60 and accompanying text.
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test.47 Thus, takings claims brought under the first prong of Agins may
essentially duplicate claims brought against the same regulations on a
substantive due process theory. Nevertheless, significant procedural, and
possibly significant substantive, differences between the two constitu-
tional theories exist.
48
2. Denial of economically viable use prong
Under the second prong of the Agins test, a taking may occur if
governmental regulations deny the owner "economically viable use of the
property."'49 The question of what, precisely, constitutes a denial of "ec-
onomically viable use" remains a hotly debated subject.5 0 In practice,
most state and federal courts construe the "economically viable use" test
as requiring prohibition of virtually all use of the property.51
Prior Supreme Court decisions make clear that for facial takings
analysis, economically viable use is measured in terms of the lawful uses
remaining to the property owner, not by the degree to which more profit-
able uses are circumscribed. 2 Thus, even drastic restrictions on use, and
resulting severe devaluations of property, have generally withstood tak-
ings challenges.53
47. See Ceilbert v. California, 218 Cal. App. 3d 234, 253, 266 Cal. Rptr. 891, 902 (1990).
48. See infra notes 161-257 and accompanying text.
49. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
50. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part I-A Critique
of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CALIF. L. Rlv. 1301, 1330-33 (1989); Comment, Just
Compensation for Temporary Takings: A Discussion of Factors Influencing DamageAwards, 35
EMORY L. J. 729 (1986).
51. See, eg., Lakeview Dev. Corp. v. City of South Lake Tahoe, 915 F.2d 1290, 1300 (9th
Cir. 1990) ("Moreover, it is clear from Lakeview's submissions that it has not been denied all
economically viable use of its land."); Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 857 F.2d 567, 570 (9th
Cir. 1988) ("a taking claim requires proof that substantially all economically viable use of the
property has been denied"), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1090 (1989); Furey v. City of Sacramento,
780 F.2d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir. 1986) ("the [Constitutional] line is crossed when such restric-
tions... deprive an owner of all economically viable uses of his land"); Terminals Equip. Co.
v. City & County of San Francisco, 221 Cal. App. 3d 234, 24243, 270 Cal. Rptr. 329, 333
(1990) ("However, the courts of this state have consistently held that before a zoning or land
use plan crosses the line separating a valid exercise of the police power from unreasonable
regulation tantamount to a compensable taking, the landowner must be deprived of 'substan-
tially all reasonable use of his [or her] property.'" (citations omitted)).
52. See, e-g., Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, at 131 (1978).
53. See, e-g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (simple prohibition of sale of lawfully
acquired property does not effect taking; nor does fact that regulations prevent most profitable
use); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (ordinance prohibiting beneficial
use to which property had previously been devoted not so onerous as to effect a taking);
Hadacheck v. Sebastion, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (nearly 90 percent reduction of value caused by
use restriction insufficient to establish a taking); William C. Haas & Co. v. City & County of
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In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Ange-
les, 4 the Supreme Court appears to have accepted the standard that "all
use" must be denied, at least for temporary takings.55 For purposes of
the decision, the Court accepted as true the plaintiff's allegations that the
challenged county ordinances denied literally "all use" of the property,
and, further, assumed that such regulations would remain in effect for a
number of years. 6 The Court did not examine the challenged ordinances
or attempt to evaluate whether they indeed permitted some residual use
of the property. 7 On remand, the California Court of Appeal undertook
such an analysis and concluded that no taking was alleged as a matter of
law because the ordinances allowed at least some minimal recreational
use of the Church's rural property.5 Under this standard, zoning regu-
lations which allow virtually any significant use of land are unlikely to be
subject to a successful facial challenge.
For a number of reasons, modern growth control regulations proba-
bly never will be found to effect a facial taking of land. First, while
growth control regulations generally inhibit major development, they do
not necessarily preclude alternate or less intensive uses of the property. 9
Where property is already partly developed, the fact that the intervention
of growth control regulations postpones completion of development
plans cannot be said to deny the owner of all economically viable use.'
In other cases, some potentially viable alternate uses of the land, such as
agricultural, limited commercial or recreational, may be unaffected by
growth control regulations.6 Less intensive forms of development, such
as individual single-family dwellings, are commonly exempted from
growth control restrictions, thus often permitting at least limited use of
San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117 (9th Cir. 1979) (rezoning of land to restrict construction of
buildings higher than forty feet, when originally zoned to permit construction of buildings to
three hundred feet did not constitute a taking even when property value reduced from two
million dollars to one hundred thousand dollars).
54. 482 U.S. 304 (1986).
55. Id. at 318.
56. Id. at 321-22.
57. See id. at 313.
58. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App.
3d 1353, 1367-71, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893, 901-05 (1989) (no taking because "[during] this period
and after the enactment ... this property could be used for agricultural and recreational
uses"), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 866 (1990).
59. See, e.g., SIMI VALLEY, CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 1, art. 18, § 9-1.1802(b) (1988) (ex-
empting mobilehome parks and certain "infill" projects of less than 15 residential units from
permit allocation requirements).
60. See Lakeview, 915 F.2d at 1300.
61. See, e.g., Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d 1449, 1451-52 (9th Cir. 1987) (ordi-
nance permitted property uses consistent with open space preservation).
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residentially zoned properties. 2 Densities as low as one unit per five
acres are clearly within the scope of economically viable use for purposes
of facial takings analysis,63 and one case suggested that densities as low
as one residential unit per 320 acres, when coupled with the opportunity
for agricultural use, may allow sufficient use to survive a facial taking
claim. 4 Some growth control systems also exempt or provide special
treatment for favored classes of development, such as affordable housing,
senior housing projects, group care homes, or other special uses. 5 In no
case will the fact that permitted development is neither the "highest and
best" use nor the use desired by the landowner transform the regulations
into a taking.
3. Delay as a per se taking
A slightly more difficult case arises where the growth regulations
permit no interim or alternate uses of the property at all. A temporary
interference with development is not normally sufficient to deprive land
of all economic value and, thus, will not normally amount to a taking.
66
Nevertheless, it has become stylish in the wake of First English to assert
that virtually any government-caused delay in development amounts to a
temporary taking which must be compensated by the governing
authorities.
The County of Los Angeles adopted the ordinance challenged in
First English in response to a serious flood in the Angeles National For-
est.67 The ordinance prohibited "construction, reconstruction, place-
ment or enlargement of any building or structure, any portion of which
was or would be located within the outer boundary lines of the interim
flood protection area."' 68 At the time of the flood, First English Evangeli-
cal Lutheran Church (the Church) owned a twenty-one acre parcel of
land in the Angeles National Forest on which it operated a campground
as a retreat center and recreational area for handicapped children. 69 The
campground buildings, a dining hall, two bunkhouses, a caretakers lodge
62. See, eg., C-Y Dev. Co. v. City of Redlands, 137 Cal. App. 3d 926, 929, 187 Cal. Rptr.
370, 372 (1982) (growth control initiative measure exempted individual single family homes,
multiple unit dwellings of fewer than four units, commercial and industrial construction).
63. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260-63.
64. Gherini v. California Coastal Comm'n, 204 Cal. App. 3d 699, 714, 251 Cal. Rptr. 426,
433-34 (1988).
65. SIMI VALLEY, CAL., MUN. CODE, ch. 1, art. 18, § 9-1.1303.b (1988) (priority to senior
and affordable housing project).
66. See infra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
67. First English, 482 U.S. at 307.
68. Los Angeles, Cal., Interim Ordinance 11,855 (Jan. 11, 1979).
69. First English, 482 U.S. at 307.
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and an outdoor chapel were destroyed in the flood. ° The Church filed a
complaint in inverse condemnation 71 alleging that the County's ordi-
nance denied all use of the property.72
The Court held that a complete prohibition of all use, even for a
temporary period, may amount to a taking for which compensation is
required. 73  The principle issue in First English, however, was whether
monetary damages were mandated as a remedy for regulatory takings.74
For purposes of the decision, the Court assumed that the Los Angeles
County ordinance denied appellant all use of its property "for a consider-
able period of years."'75 The Court did not elaborate on whether rela-
tively short-term restrictions or a less than total prohibition of use would
necessarily amount to a temporary taking.76 The Court stated: "We
merely hold that where the government's activities have already worked
a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government
can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during
which the taking was effective."
77
Although the Court did not provide an explicit test for determining
when delay rises to the level of a taking, the Court recognized that
"'temporary' takings which, as here, deny a landowner all use of his
property, are not different in kind from permanent takings, for which the
Constitution clearly requires compensation."7" This language strongly
suggests that the factors considered in traditional takings analysis also
may be considered in evaluating whether a temporary interference with
use amounts to a taking. Lower courts have subsequently followed this
approach.79
There are several reasons to suspect that growth control regulations
will continue to withstand facial takings claims in the wake of First Eng-
lish. First, growth control ordinances by themselves generally do not
70. Id.
71. Inverse condemnation should be contrasted with eminent domain. Eminent domain
refers to a legal proceeding in which a government authority asserts its power to condemn
property. United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 255-58 (1980). Inverse condemnation is an
action brought by a landowner to recover just compensation for a taking of property when
condemnation proceedings have not been initiated. Id. at 257.
72. First English, 482 U.S. at 308.
73. Id. at 317-19.
74. See id. at 310-12.
75. Id. at 322.
76. Id. at 318-21.
77. Id. at 321.
78. Id. at 318.
79. See, e.g., Zilber v. Town of Moraga, 692 F. Supp. 1195, 1205-06 (N.D. Cal. 1988);
Guinnane v. City & County of San Francisco, 197 Cal. App. 3d 862, 868, 241 Cal. Rptr. 787,
790-91 (1987), cert denied, 488 U.S. 823 (1988).
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foreclose future use, as may a downzoning, s0 but merely tend to postpone
the time when permitted development may occur. This is significant be-
cause the land may retain considerable market value despite the regula-
tions. Retention of resale value has been considered a significant factor
in determining whether building moratoria or denial of development per-
mits constitute a denial of all economically viable use."1
In First English, the Supreme Court expressly distinguished devel-
opment delays caused by reasonable regulatory activity from outright
prohibitions of use, stating: "We limit our holding to the facts presented,
and of course do not deal with the quite different questions that would
arise in the case of normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes
in zoning ordinances, variances and the like which are not before us."82
Indeed the Court had previously indicated that such "normal delays"
would not amount to a taking.
83
Even where no substantial development is allowed for extended peri-
ods, additional factors may militate against finding a taking. Any recip-
rocal benefits which accrue to the regulated land must be taken into
account in assessing whether the regulation amounts to an uncompen-
sated taking.84 Courts also consider the potential for interim uses, albeit
less intensive and less profitable, which may be permitted pending full
development of the regulated property. In Golden v. Planning Board of
Ramapo, 5 these collective factors persuaded the court that planned de-
velopment delays of up to eighteen years for some properties did not
amount to a taking. The ordinance involved in Ramapo disallowed sub-
division until proposed municipal services were completed according to
an eighteen-year plan. 6 The Court stated:
An ordinance which seeks to permanently restrict the use of
property so that it may not be used for any reasonable purpose
must be recognized as a taking.... An appreciably different
situation obtains where the restriction constitutes a temporary
restriction, promising that the property may be put to a profita-
ble use within a reasonable time. The hardship of holding un-
80. Downzoning is "[a] process by which the allowable intensity of development on a
zoned parcel of land is reduced." D. GODSCHALK, D. BROWER, L. MCBENNETT, B. VESTAL
& D. HERR, CONSTruTiONAL ISSUES OF GROWTH MANAGEMENT 419 (1979).
81. See, eg., MacLeod v. Santa Clara County, 749 F.2d 541, 547 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 472 U.S. 1009 (1985); Guinnane, 197 Cal. App. 3d at 868-69, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 791.
82. First English, 482 U.S. at 321.
83. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 263 n.9.
84. See, eg., iL at 255, 262; Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 133-35.
85. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003
(1972).
86. Id. at 366-67, 285 N.E.2d at 294-95, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 142-43.
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productive property for some time might be compensated for
by the ultimate benefit inuring to the individual owner in the
form of a substantial increase in valuation. 7
At some point delays caused by government regulations may pass
rational bounds. Reported cases, though, indicate periods of delay up to
eight years before cases were deemed ripe for adjudication." Delays of
several years caused by planning studies or development moratoria have
been upheld routinely against taking challenges.8 9 Where liability has
been found, it has been based on unreasonable delays which violated due
process requirements, or the equivalent "substantial relationship" prong
of the Agins test.90 As discussed below,91 it will ordinarily be difficult to
estimate at the time of enactment just how much delay any given prop-
erty owner may experience as a result of growth control measures. It
appears, however, that as long as there is a rational basis for the regula-
tions themselves, delays of up to eight to ten years may be acceptable,
unless it can be shown that such delays effectively deprive the land of all
present value.
4. The ripeness prerequisite
The ripeness requirement may be a very substantial practical prob-
lem for successfully litigating a facial takings claim based on anticipated
delays.9 2 The Supreme Court requires that the precise effect of zoning
regulations be known before any takings claim is litigated.93 Thus, a
challenge to zoning or other regulations is not ripe for adjudication
where the effect of the regulation is uncertain or depends upon future
87. Id. at 380, 285 N.E.2d at 303, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 154.
88. See, e.g., Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172, 186-94 (1985) (case premature unless following final decision); Norco Constr. v. King
County, 801 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (9th Cir. 1986) (five-year wait did not mature until final state
agency review).
89. See, e.g., Zilber, 692 F. Supp. at 1206-07 (18-month moratorium on certain develop-
ment applications not ripe for review); Guinnane, 197 Cal. App. 3d at 866-70, 241 Cal. Rptr.
at 790-92 (city's more than one-year delay in acting on developer's building permit not a tem-
porary taking).
90. See, e.g., Urbanizadora Versalles, Inc. v. Rios, 701 F.2d 993, 996-97 (1st Cir. 1983)
(14-year interference by pre-condemnation activities unreasonable). See supra notes 42-48 and
infra notes 132-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the first prong of theAgins test.
91. See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 181-227 and accompanying text for further discussion of the ripeness
requirement.
93. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 348-51 (1986) ("Our
cases uniformly reflect an insistence on knowing the nature and extent of permitted develop-
ment before adjudicating the constitutionality of the regulations that purport to limit it."); see
Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclama-
tion Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
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events. The Court has stated: "A court cannot determine whether a reg-
ulation has gone 'too far' unless it knows how far the regulation goes."
'94
As a practical matter, landowners and developers are seldom in a
position to show that the mere enactment of growth control regulations
will inevitably and necessarily prevent timely development of their par-
ticular properties. Unlike a development moratorium, a growth control
plan generally permits some ongoing development to occur each year.95
In systems which rely on annual or semi-annual allocation of building
permits, each landowner theoretically has at least some prospect of se-
curing permits in any given cycle. In addition, the ordinances may pro-
vide exceptions or exemptions for certain forms of development which
the landowner remains free to pursue.96 As long as either of these pros-
pects exists, the landowner cannot demonstrate with the required degree
of certainty that mere enactment of the growth control regulations will
inevitably inflict a constitutionally impermissible amount of delay on po-
tential building plans. Challenges to the system must instead be pursued
on an as applied basis, after making reasonable, but unsuccessful, at-
tempts to secure development approvals.
B. As-Applied Takings Claims
The second method of attacking governmental regulations is as ap-
plied to the property owner's land. An as-applied claim generally
presumes that the applicant has made reasonable efforts to develop in
compliance with challenged regulations before seeking relief from the
courts.97 In such a claim, the plaintiff is not required to show that no
economically viable use of his or her property is possible under the chal-
lenged regulations, but only that reasonable use has in fact been denied.9"
In the as-applied context, courts also may consider whether the gov-
ernmental regulatory scheme, though reasonable on its face, inflicts irra-
tional or excessive results on the particular property owned by the
94. MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 348.
95. See, eg., Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 908, 900-01 (9th
Cir. 1975) (ordinance restricted housing development growth rate to 500 dwelling units per
year).
96. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
97. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 191
(1985); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). Indeed, such efforts are required before an
as applied claim may be deemed ripe for adjudication. For a further discussion of ripeness, see
infra notes 181-227 and accompanying text.
98. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138
n.36 (1978).
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plaintiff.99 Judicial review here is more flexible and more fact specific
than in a facial challenge."° As a result, the Supreme Court has admit-
ted its inability to define clear guidelines in the as-applied area.101 The
Supreme Court emphasized three factors as the most important: (1) the
"character" of the governmental action; (2) its "economic impact;" and
(3) its interference with any "distinct, reasonable investment-backed ex-
pectations" of the landowner. 10 2 These factors are not exclusive, but are
identified as "of particular significance" in determining "when 'justice
and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action be
compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately
concentrated on a few persons."
10 3
No published decision specificily has applied these three factors to
growth control regulations. In the context of growth management regu-
lations, the claim will normally be delay of the landowner's development
plans. Landowners may allege either that the regulations have inflicted
gratuitous delay without a good or adequate public purpose, or that the
impact of delay has amounted to a temporary taking which requires com-
pensation. Nevertheless, analysis of the specific factors mandated by the
Supreme Court normally will not favor the conclusion that a taking has
occurred, absent periods of extraordinary delay or special circumstances.
1. Character
The character of the governmental action serves primarily to distin-
guish takings which are physical or appropriative in nature from those
which are purely regulatory. In addition, assessment of the character of
regulatory actions also requires consideration of whether the actions are
arbitrary, or unfairly single out an individual property owner to bear
public burdens.
Governmental actions which require the landowner to submit to ac-
tual physical occupation or to public use of a portion of the property are
far more likely to be deemed a taking than those which merely regulate
99. Cf Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 332 (1981)
(rejecting as unripe challenge alleging statute may be irrational as applied to some properties).
100. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260-63; Penn CenL, 438 U.S. at 124; United States v. Central Eu-
reka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958).
101. Penn CenL, 438 U.S. at 124; Central Eureka Mining, 357 U.S. at 168.
102. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1985); Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175
(1979).
103. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 295 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175
(1979)).
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the owner's use.1 "1 Actions which also extinguish or appropriate a dis-
tinct "fundamental attribute of ownership" may more readily be la-
belled as takings, even if they do not totally deprive the property of value.
To date, the only such fundamental interests identified by the Supreme
Court are the rights to exclude others1°6 and to devise property.10 7 The
right, to sell, however, is apparently not such a fundamental attribute. 108
Evidence that a growth control measure has interfered with resale of the
property is thus not, in and of itself, sufficient to demonstrate a taking.
At the opposite extreme are governmental regulations which are
purely regulatory in nature, and operate by adjusting public benefits and
burdens on a broad scale. Growth control regulations generally fall
within this category. Growth control pursues generalized, community-
wide public benefits, while distributiig the burdens on a broad class of
property owners rather than on one or a few individuals. A different case
might arise where a single property was singled out for regulation, or
where a growth control system was entirely irrational in concept. In the
normal case, however, growth control measures amount to legitimate,
purely regulatory actions, and thus, may not be labelled as takings on the
basis of character.1"
2. Economic impact
The economic impact factor requires consideration of whether the
government regulation imposes an actual economic loss on the plaintiff.
104. Compare Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (ordi-
nance requiring landlord to allow physical installation of cable television wiring on premises
found to be taking) and Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 180 (government imposed public naviga-
tional easement) with PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1979) (fact that
property was physically invaded was not determinative of a taking).
Regulations that simply function as a disguised form of appropriation of public easements
or other property interests, may also be deemed takings, unless justified by the need to mitigate
adverse impacts caused by development of the property. See Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (public access easement on beach found to be taking where no
logical relationship between dedication requirement and adverse impacts of proposed use).
Such issues are not normally considered in growth management regulations which merely at-
tempt to regulate the timing of development.
105. Agins, 447 U.S. at 262.
106. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435-36 (power to exclude traditionally considered one of most
treasured strands in one's bundle of property rights); Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179-80 (power
to exclude fundamental).
107. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716-18 (1987).
108. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) (federal law making it illegal to sell
bald or golden eagle parts although material was legally obtained, did not amount to a taking).
109. Creative Env'ts v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 831-34, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 989 (1982);
Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 381-82, 285 N.E.2d 291, 304, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138, 154-55, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
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Economic impact is measured against the economic value left to the
property owner after the alleged taking, rather than by the economic
value lost to the owner.110 The Supreme Court has stated that,
"[i]mpairment of the market value of real property incident to otherwise
legitimate government action ordinarily does not result in a taking." '111
Even drastic restrictions or downzonings of property have routinely been
found to be merely legitimate regulation of land rather than takings.112
It is not entirely clear whether regulations need always deprive the
owner of all economic value of the property to effect a taking. The char-
acter of the action may sometimes be sufficient to support a taking
claim.113 In addition, extreme periods of delay may sufficiently erode the
land's current value that a temporary taking might be found during the
period that the land is totally unsalable.' 11 Absent such special circum-
stances, however, a regulatory taking probably will not be found where
the property retains economically viable uses or substantial economic
value.
Consideration of the economic impact of a governmental action also
permits consideration of factors beyond those strictly related to the use of
land. Where the economic effect is palpably de minimus, even regula-
tions which impose burdens of an arguably physical character may not
amount to a taking.115 Another important economic consideration is the
market value of the land after the imposition of the regulation. As previ-
ously noted, however, even a substantial interim reduction in the market
value of land will not support a taking claim. The Court has explained,
"[a]t least in the absence of an interference with an owner's legal right to
dispose of his land, even a substantial reduction of the attractiveness of
the property to potential purchasers does not entitle the owner to com-
pensation under the Fifth Amendment."
116
The economic impact factor also permits another important eco-
110. Penn Cent, 438 U.S. at 131.
111. Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 15 (1984).
112. Penn CenL, 438 U.S. at 131; William C. Haas & Co. v. City & County of San Fran-
cisco, 605 F.2d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 1979); HFH Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 514,
542 P.2d 237, 244, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365, 369 (1975).
113. See, e.g., Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-35 (physical character); Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at
179-80 (physical taking for public use).
114. Richmond Elks Hall Ass'n v. Richmond Redevelopment Agency, 561 F.2d 1327, 1331
(1977) (property rendered valueless and unsaleable by pre-condemnation activities).
115. See, e.g., PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 83-84 (allowing freedom of expression and right to
petition on private shopping center property does not sufficiently impair value to be considered
a taking). But see Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-37 ("Constitutional protection for the rights of
private property cannot be made to depend on the size of the area occupied.").
116. Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 15 (footnotes omitted).
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nomic consideration-that of any "reciprocal benefits" which accrue to
the property as a result of regulation.' 17  The ordinance involved in
Agins v. Tiburon 118 restricted density to between one and five single fam-
ily residences per five acres of land.1 19 In determining reciprocal benefits,
the Agins Court noted:
The zoning ordinances benefit the appellants as well as the pub-
lic by serving the city's interest in assuring careful and orderly
development of residential property with provision for open-
space areas. There is no indication that the appellant's [five]-
acre tract is the only property affected by the ordinance. Ap-
pellants therefore will share with other owners the benefits and
burdens of the city's exercise of its police power. In assessing
the fairness of the zoning ordinances, these benefits must be
considered along with any diminution in market value that ap-
pellants might suffer.120
Community-wide growth control regulations are likely to create pre-
cisely the type of reciprocal benefits discussed in Agins and other cases.
Purchasers of homes in growth-control communities presumably enjoy a
benefit in terms of reduced traffic, crowding and community character;
such benefits are likely to be reflected in the purchase price received by
the developer. Such regulation may thus indirectly result in an economic
windfall to the developer.
3. Reasonable investment-backed expectations
The significance which must be afforded the landowner's reasonable
investment-backed expectations is not well defined by the case law.'21
Despite the terminology, this phrase does not authorize consideration of
the purely subjective expectations of the landowner or developer. The
relatively narrow scope of the analysis of investment-backed expectations
in takings cases is suggested by the Supreme Court in Kirby Forest Indus-
tries v. United States:
122
Under some circumstances, a land-use regulation that severely
interfered with an owner's "distinct investment-backed expec-
117. See, e.g., Agins, 447 U.S. at 262; Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 134-35.
118. 447 U.S. 225 (1980).
119. Id. at 257.
120. Id. at 262.
121. See Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 175; Penn Cent, 438 U.S. at 124; Park Avenue Tower
Assocs. v. City of New York, 746 F.2d 135, 139 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1087
(1985); Sussna, The Concept of Highest and Best Use Under Takings Theory, 28 URB. LAW.
113, 113-35 (1984).
122. 467 U.S. 1 (1984).
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tations" might precipitate a taking.... The principle that un-
derlies this doctrine is that, while most burdens consequent
upon government action undertaken in the public interest must
be borne by individual landowners as concomitants of "the ad-
vantage of living and doing business in a civilized community,"
some are so substantial and unforeseeable, and can so easily be
identified and redistributed, that "justice and fairness" requires
that they be borne by the public as a whole.
123
The case law emphasizes that interference with settled expectations
must be substantial and unforeseeable, and also that the expectations
must be reasonable. 2 In areas subject to extensive, ongoing regulation,
there can seldom be a reasonable expectation that current rights will re-
main inviolate against future regulation. 2 There are clearly few areas as
subject to extensive ongoing regulation as land use.
The limitation on the doctrine of distinct investment-backed expec-
tations is constitutionally based. The takings clause protects property,
not expectations.' 26 While the notion of property includes a variety of
legal rights going beyond the right of mere physical possession, 127 no
court yet has recognized a property interest created solely by the unilat-
eral acts or declaration of the owner. The zone of protected property
interests has been confined to settled expectations, usually based on state
property laws.
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 28 the
Supreme Court acknowledged the relationship between property rights
and constitutionally cognizable expectations by noting past cases in
which takings claims were dismissed on the ground that, "while the chal-
lenged government action caused economic harm, it did not interfere
with interests that were sufficiently bound up with the reasonable expec-
123. Id. at 14 (citations omitted).
124. See Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1005-07.
125. See, eg., Connolly, 475 U.S. at 226-27 (employers had no reasonable expectation that
regulations involving pension plans would not be changed in manner which imposed substan-
tial additional liabilities); Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1006-07 (no reasonable investment-backed
expectation that data submitted to the Environmental Protection Agency would be kept confi-
dential); Atlas Corp. v. United States, 895 F.2d 745, 758 (9th Cir.) (regulation of nuclear
industry), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 46 (1990); Pace Resources v. Shrewsbury Township, 808
F.2d 1023, 1033 (3d Cir. 1987) ("[D]istinct, investment-backed expectations are reasonable
only if they take into account the power of the state to regulate in the public interest.").
126. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980); Pace Resources,
808 F.2d at 1033.
127. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text for a discussion of property rights other
than physical possession.
128. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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tations of the claimant to constitute 'property' for Fifth Amendment pur-
poses." '129 While the takings analysis may leave some room for
recognition of legal rights and mutual understandings beyond those
which are traditionally deemed property, it does not authorize a land-
owner to unilaterally redefine property rights or limit governmental pre-
rogatives on the basis of purely subjective expectations. A landowner's
investment-backed expectations are thus significant, or reasonable, only
when they are consistent with settled legal understandings, usually based
on state law.13
0
In the 1990s, difficulty arises in arguing that enactment of growth
control regulations interferes with reasonable investment-backed expec-
tations. Twenty years ago landowners may have argued that time-related
growth restrictions were sufficiently beyond the pale of foreseeable zon-
ing regulation to defy the reasonable expectations of developers. Such an
argument has no merit today. Growth control measures have been com-
mon since the 1970s. A developer who buys or holds land for future
development in any urbanizing area must be deemed to do so with the
knowledge that local government agencies may adopt growth manage-
ment regulations.
1 31
III. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Substantive due process132 analysis is based on the notion that the
powers of government, broad as they may be, are subject to limits.1 33
Exercises of the government's police power are valid only as long as they
are rational and serve some colorable public interest.1 34 The test for sub-
stantive due process is, at least on the surface, essentially the same as the
129. Id. at 124-25.
130. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (property rights "are not created
by the Constitution. Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules
or understanding that stem from an independent source such as state law."). See, e.g., Ruckel-
shaus, 467 U.S. at 1001; Webb's Fabulous, 449 U.S. at 161.
131. Developers may protect themselves from the effects of future regulations through ne-
gotiation of development agreements or similar devices in some states. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 65865 (West 1983). In the absence of such agreement, it appears that a developer
normally will have no vested right to build even an already approved project free from the time
restrictions imposed by new growth control measures, unless such projects are specifically ex-
empted. See Pardee Constr. Co. v. City of Camarillo, 37 Cal. 3d 465, 471-73, 690 P.2d 701,
705-06, 208 Cal. Rptr. 228, 232-33 (1984).
132. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
133. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 367, 372-73 (1976); E. BAR-
RETT, W. COHEN & J. VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 551-52 (1989).
134. Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 367, 372-73.
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first prong of the Agins v. Tiburon 135 test for regulatory takings.1 3 6 A
regulation will be upheld against a substantive due process challenge un-
less it is found "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial
relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare."'
137
To challenge a governmental action or regulation on substantive due
process grounds successfully, the plaintiff thus must plead and prove that
the government action is wholly arbitrary and capricious or irrational, or
utterly fails to serve any legitimate purpose. 138 This test is applied with
extreme deference to both the policy judgments of elected legislative bod-
ies, and the means chosen to implement legislative goals.139 The regula-
tions are presumed valid, and will be upheld if their relationship to
legitimate goals is "fairly debatable."'" Some federal circuits appear to
impose an even stricter standard, requiring the plaintiff to show virtually
malicious or intentionally arbitrary governmental conduct. 4 ' Govern-
mental conduct does not violate substantive due process simply because
it is mistaken, violative of state or local laws, or relies on bad assump-
tions or information. 42 Gross violations of local or state laws, such as
the imposition of impermissible special conditions or denial of ministerial
permits, may, however, amount to arbitrary and capricious conduct.
143
Such cases, however, generally involve specific arbitrary acts directed at
particular property owners, rather than the enactment or enforcement of
general regulations.
The leading due process case on growth control regulations, Con-
135. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
136. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
137. Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395; see also Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183,
188 (1928) (zoning ordinance that injured plaintiff's property and did not promote city general
welfare violated fourteenth amendment).
138. Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1577 (11th Cir. 1989); Nelson v.
City of Selma, 881 F.2d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1989); Pace Resources v. Shrewsbury Township,
808 F.2d 1023, 1034-35 (3d Cir. 1987).
139. See Nectow, 277 U.S. at 185; Nelson, 881 F.2d. at 839.
140. Nelson, 881 F.2d at 839; accord Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15
(1976).
141. Coniston v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 467-68 (7th Cir. 1988); Burrell
v. City of Kanakee, 815 F.2d 1127, 1129 (7th Cir. 1987); Chiplin Enter. v. City of Lebanon,
712 F.2d 1524, 1527 (1st Cir. 1983).
142. Harding v. County of Door, 870 F.2d 430, 431-32 (7th Cir.) (erroneous interpretation
of state law), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 154 (1989); Creative Env'ts v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822,
833-34 (1st Cir.) (noncompliance with state or local regulations not basis for substantive due
process claim), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 989 (1982).
143. Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300, 1303-04 (9th Cir. 1988) (city council's singling out
of individual deemed arbitrary and thus violative of substantive due process); Littlefield v. City
of Afton, 785 F.2d 596, 606 (8th Cir. 1986) (imposition of unconstitutional condition on grant
of permit violated substantive due process).
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struction Industry Association v. City of Petaluma,t44 suggests that sub-
stantive due process attacks are extremely unlikely to succeed in most
cases. The ordinance challenged in Petaluma was a classic growth con-
trol system which restricted the issuance of building permits for new resi-
dential projects to five hundred units per year.141 Projects involving four
or fewer housing units were exempt from the regulations.' 46 The Ninth
Circuit had no difficulty identifying a legitimate public purpose for the
regulations-that of avoiding "uncontrolled and rapid growth," and its
attendant adverse consequences in terms of increased traffic, noise, loss of
community character and other factors which also have been summa-
rized as the "quality of life."' 47
The Petaluma court also rejected a number of other arguments com-
monly advanced in growth control litigation, and emphasized the narrow
scope of substantive review permitted under the federal due process
clause.148 The Ninth Circuit specifically rejected the argument that regu-
lations could be challenged on the ground that they had an exclusionary
purpose, or other undesirable side effects.' 49 The court similarly rejected
the argument that the regulations violated substantive due process be-
cause they failed to address perceived regional housing needs or other
competing public concerns: "[T]he federal court is not a super zoning
board and should not be called on to mark the point at which legitimate
local interests in promoting the welfare of the community are outweighed
by legitimate regional interests."' 0  The decision thus also clearly re-
jected the use of a "regional welfare" standard employed by some state
courts,15' as the measure of legitimate public purposes. The court stated:
"If the present system of delegated zoning power does not effectively
serve the state interest in furthering the general welfare of the region or
entire state, it is the state legislature's and not the federal courts' role to
144. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1976).
145. Id. at 901.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 906; see also Smithfield Concerned Citizens for Fair Zoning v. Town of Smith-
field, 907 F.2d 239, 245 (1st Cir. 1990) (zoning regulation's purpose to lessen congestion, pre-
vent overcrowding, provide adequate light and air deemed legitimate public purpose).
148. Petaluma, 522 F.2d at 906.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 908.
151. See, eg., Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 601, 557
P.2d 473, 483, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 51 (1976) (constitutionality of zoning restriction which sig-
nificantly affects residents of surrounding communities must be measured by its impact not
only on welfare of enacting community, but also on welfare of surrounding region); Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 204-05, 456 A.2d 390,
415 (1983).
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intervene and adjust the system."'152 -
The Petaluma decision reflects the difficulties facing any substantive
due process challenge to growth management regulations. The federal
constitution does not require growth control restrictions to be linked to
specific resource or infrastructure constraints-such as lack of adequate
roadways, schools, water supplies or other essential services-to be valid.
More general "quality of life" objectives will almost invariably provide
the legitimate public purposes necessary to sustain growth control plans
against general facial attacks. Such quality of life objectives have been
found legitimate in numerous cases.' 53 The means adopted by growth
control regulations-restricting growth-are clearly one means of sub-
stantially advancing these public objectives, and therefore possess the ra-
tional relationship to their lawful goals which is necessary to survive
constitutional scrutiny.
If landowners are to challenge growth management regulations suc-
cessfully on substantive due process grounds, they will have to address
narrower issues. Growth control measures which purport to be based
solely on resource constraints or other narrow grounds may be vulnera-
ble. Scarcity of resources, such as water supplies or sewage treatment
capacity, are normally constitutionally permissible grounds for restrict-
ing development.' 54 Factual questions may arise, however, as to whether
the purported scarcity actually exists. A development ban based solely
on purported water shortages, for example, may not be valid where abun-
dant water is, in fact, available and being given freely to other users.155
Regulations cannot be deemed substantially to advance any legitimate
152. Petaluma, 522 F.2d at 908.
153. See, e.g., Agins, 447 U.S. at 261 (preservation of open space, prevention of premature
urbanization); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (preservation of quiet,
healthy community character); Barancik v. County of Matin, 872 F.2d 834, 837 (9th Cir.)
(preservation of agriculture and "bucolic atmosphere"), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 242 (1989);
Pace Resources, 808 F.2d at 1030 ("Controlling the rate and character of community growth is
the very objective of land use planning .... "); Giuliano v. Town of Edgarton, 531 F. Supp.
1076, 1080-85 (D. Mass. 1982) (insure adequate provision of municipal services and orderly
development beneficial to community as a whole); Dateline Builders v. City of Santa Rosa, 146
Cal. App. 3d 520, 528-30, 194 Cal. Rptr. 258, 265 (1983) (deterrence of leapfrog development
patterns).
154. See, e.g., Smoke Rise, Inc. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 400 F. Supp.
1369, 1383-84 (D. Md. 1975) (growth moratoria implemented on ground of inadequate sewer
service permissible so long as pursuant to comprehensive plan for improvement of sewer sys-
tem); Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138
(development demand may be impeded where growth restrictions are imposed pursuant to well
reasoned comprehensive plans for improvement of physical infrastructure of region), appeal
dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
155. Lockary v. Kayfetz, 917 F.2d 1150, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 1990).
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public interest in such cases if there is no actual or threatened shortage or
resulting threat to the public welfare. The significance of this rule for
planning jurisdictions with general police powers may be limited. As
long as development regulations are based, at least in part, on larger
quality of life concerns, they should remain largely immune from sub-
stantive due process challenge under the federal constitution. 156 Limita-
tions upon the rate or amount of further development will by definition
further the purposes of preserving existing community character or aes-
thetics, open space, or other legitimate values.
Substantive due process claims might also challenge the methods by
which building permits or other entitlements are issued under a growth
management ordinance. Growth management systems rely on a variety
of procedures for allocating development permits. Such procedures vary
from simple first-come-first-serve systems through elaborate procedures,
often dubbed "beauty contests," in which competing development
156. Growth control regulations often set forth a statement of purposes and corollary find-
ings in recitals or preambles. This frequently facilitates summary adjudication of substantive
due process challenges, since the public objectives and rationality of the means chosen can be
ascertained from the face of the regulations. However, landowners may also seek to capitalize
on these statements of purpose by questioning the factual basis for any included legislative
findings, by insisting that only those objectives specifically set forth in the recitals be consid-
ered, or by alleging that the stated purposes are simply a sham, intended to conceal impermis-
sible (usually elitist) ulterior motives.
Whether alleged subjective motives may be considered in a due process attack on an ordi-
nance or other legislative act is questionable. Legislative motives are generally relevant only in
cases of discrimination. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-66 (1977). Where the governmental action furthers legitimate gov-
ernmental purposes, the subjective motive of the decision-makers, absent racial animus or
other expressly prohibited conduct, is irrelevant. Smithfield, 907 F.2d at 245 (not province of
court to monitor input into each legislative decision). Some basic logic exists in this position.
First, if the action furthers some legitimate public interest, it is necessarily within the scope of
the police power. The fact that it was done for the wrong reasons does not render the act ultra
vires. Stated in other terms, if the public benefits, it is immaterial that it benefits out of spite.
Conversely, courts may also consider other purposes beyond those expressly stated on the
face of regulations. However, where a valid purpose and reasonable means are apparent from
the face of the action, a landowner is not entitled to a full trial on the "real reasons" for
governmental action. Northside Sanitary Landfill v. City of Indianapolis, 902 F.2d 521, 522
(7th Cir. 1990).
A number of decisions indicate that improper motives may be considered in determining
whether individual permit or zoning decisions violate substantive due process. See, e.g., Green-
briar, 881 F.2d at 1579 n.18 (personal animosity); Haskell v. Washington Township, 864 F.2d
1266, 1277 (6th Cir. 1988) (desire to suppress abortion clinic); Brady v. Town of Colchester,
863 F.2d 205, 217 (2d Cir. 1988) (decisions motivated by desire to suppress free speech or
engage in political retaliation); Harrison v. Springdale Water & Sewer Comm'n, 780 F.2d
1422, 1427-28 (8th Cir. 1986) (retaliation for resort to courts); Wilkerson v. Johnson, 699 F.2d
325, 328-29 (6th Cir. 1983) (bias in issuance of barbershop license). Such cases, however,
involve the singling out of individuals and their property for allegedly arbitrary treatment, an
element not likely to be present in the enactment of general zoning regulations.
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projects are ranked and granted priority on the basis of various merit
criteria adopted by the local government. 157 Other systems rely on the
phasing of growth geographically, in accordance with development pat-
terns ordained by a general plan or infrastructure development plans.15
These allocation systems conceivably may be attacked on the ground that
they are arbitrary, irrational or utterly fail to further their professed pur-
poses. A merit allocation system which rates competing developments
upon criteria having no tangible bearing on the public welfare would not
likely withstand substantive due process review. 59 Where the selection
criteria tend to further any legitimate government goal, however, due
process is not offended.
The application of growth control regulations may also at times en-
gender substantive due process claims. Developers who are unsuccessful
in obtaining permits through allocation systems may feel that the selec-
tion criteria or the system itself have been applied unfairly or arbitrarily
in practice. Such claims, however, will probably fall under the rules ap-
plicable to individual permit challenges which limit review to the ques-
tion of whether the decisionmaker could have any reasonable basis under
the relevant criteria for denial,"6 they should not affect the validity of
the parent regulations themselves.
IV. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TAKINGS AND
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
The relationship between takings analysis and substantive due pro-
cess analysis is less than clear in the existing case law. Efforts either to
reconcile or explain the two constitutional theories in the context of land
use litigation have spawned a variety of analyses, and in some cases vari-
157. See, e.g., Pacifica Corp. v. City of Camarillo, 149 Cal. App. 3d 168, 172-73, 196 Cal.
Rptr. 670, 673 (1983).
158. See, e.g., Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d at 366-67, 285 N.E.2d at 294-95, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 142-
43.
159. Examples of such regulations might be rating systems which rank development
projects based upon the applicant's performance in a dance contest before the city council,
loyalty to a local athletic team, the political affiliation of the property owner, or other matters
unrelated to proper police power regulation.
In addition, selection criteria which relate exclusively to benefits conferred on neighboring
residents or other narrow private interests may be suspect. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-14 (1922) (coal mining regulations which benefitted only overlying
private landowners held a taking). But see Nelson, 881 F.2d at 840 (local neighborhood con-
cerns properly considered in rejecting zoning application).
160. See, e.g., Bateson, 857 F.2d at 1303 (arbitrary denial of building permits); Scudder v.
Town of Greendale, 704 F.2d 999, 1002-03 (7th Cir. 1983) (building permits properly re-
jected); Southern Coop. Dev. Fund v. Driggers, 696 F.2d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 1983) (subdivi-
sion plat denied upon basis of criteria not authorized by applicable regulations).
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ous hybrids complete with a new vocabulary of their own. 161
Arguably, takings analysis should not address the propriety of gov-
ernmental regulations at all, but merely whether the damage is sufficient
to amount to a taking. Under such an approach, the first prong of the
Agins v. Tiburon 62 test-whether the regulation substantially advances
legitimate state interests 1 6-would be treated simply as a substantive
due process issue. This is consistent with the role of substantive due pro-
cess as essentially a check on the legitimacy or validity of exercises of the
police power, and would reserve takings analysis for the question of
whether property has been damaged to the extent that compensation is
required. It is also consistent with the express language of the fifth
amendment, which provides for compensation only where property is
taken "for public use." 164 While regulations which fail to further any
legitimate public purpose may well violate the constitution, it cannot log-
ically be said that such regulations take property for the public benefit.
Nevertheless, it appears that due process considerations are too
deeply imbedded in takings jurisprudence to.permit a withdrawal now.
The Supreme Court stared the issue in the face in Williamson County
Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank 165 and walked away
leaving both species of claims intact. 1 66 The Williamson County decision
further suggests that if push comes to shove, the Supreme Court would
prefer to abolish substantive due process as an independent claim rather
than limit the two prong Agins test for takings. The Supreme Court,
indeed, has recently indicated a willingness to eliminate substantive due
process as the all-purpose constitutional tort it has become, and limit
substantive due process claims to those cases where no colorable in-
dependent constitutional guarantees applied.
1 67
Elimination of either the first prong of Agins or substantive due pro-
cess as an independent cause of action likely would simplify land use
cases, at the possible expense of lively ongoing academic debate. Despite
the similarities between substantive due process analysis and analysis
161. See, eg., Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 721-22 (11th Cir. 1990) (distinguish-
ing "arbitrary and capricious due process" claim from "due process takings claim"); Smith-
field Concerned Citizens for Fair Zoning v. Town of Smithfield, 907 F.2d 239, 242 (lst Cir.
1990) (distinguishing substantive due process claims from classic due process claims).
162. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
163. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
164. U.S. CONsT. amend V.
165. 473 U.S. 172, 197-200 (1984).
166. See id.
167. See Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1870-71 (1989) ("validity of claim must be
judged by reference to the specific constitutional standard which governs the right, rather than
to some generalized ... standard").
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under the reasonable basis branch of the takings test, there are significant
practical differences in the way such cases must be litigated. These prac-
tical considerations include questions of ripeness, statutes of limitations
and measure of damages, all of which may have major tactical implica-
tions in any given case. These differences are discussed further in later
sections.' 68 There is, however, also a substantial question as to whether
the applicable standards for review under the due process and takings
clauses of the Constitution are in fact the same.
A. Are the Standards for Due Process and Takings the Same?
In Williamson County the Supreme Court explained substantive due
process, in the land use context, as resting on the theory that "regulation
that goes so far that it has the same effect as a taking by eminent domain
is an invalid exercise of the police power, violative of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 69 It went on to explain that the
remedy in such cases is invalidation of the overreaching regulations, and
"if authorized and appropriate, actual damages."' 70 Under this theory,
regulatory takings and substantive due process claims are co-extensive,
and the only distinction is in the choice of remedy.
There are, however, other bases for substantive due process claims.
Not every government regulatory action which fails to advance some le-
gitimate governmental purpose logically can be equated with a taking.
The courts commonly have employed the terms "arbitrary," "capri-
cious," or similar terms of condemnation for the type of government ac-
tion which violates the substantive limitations of the due process
clause.17 1 Some federal circuits have suggested that even more is re-
quired to recover damages under a substantive due process theory.
These courts require a showing that the governmental action was virtu-
ally willful or malicious in nature.' 72 Under such a standard, a land-
168. See infra notes 181-257 and accompanying text.
169. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 197
(1984).
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1577 (11th Cir. 1989)
("[A] deprivation of a property interest is of constitutional stature if it is undertaken "'for an
improper motive and by means that were pretextual, arbitrary and capricious, and... without
any rational basis .... (citations omitted)); Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844
F.2d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Thus, by 'arbitrary and unreasonable' . . . we meant invidious
or irrational."); Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1129 (3d Cir. 1988) (" 'a deprivation must
contain some element of abuse of governmental power, for the "touchstone of due process is
protection of the individual against arbitrary action of the government" '" (citations
omitted)).
172. See, eg., Chongris v. Board of Appeals of Andover, 811 F.2d 36, 43 (1st Cir.) (no
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owner will likely find that he or she faces a lesser burden of proof by
attacking the government actions on a takings theory.
The Supreme Court also has clouded the waters recently with lan-
guage found in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission. 73 At issue in
Nollan was whether the California Coastal Commission could condition
the granting of a permit to rebuild the Nollan's residence upon the Nol-
lans agreeing to provide the public with an easement across their beach-
front property.174 The Court held that, on the facts of the case, the
permit condition did not further the governmental purpose advanced as
justification for the condition-offsetting the visual impacts of develop-
ment to inland viewers, 171 thus the state would have to pay for the ac-
cess.1 76 A footnote in Nollan suggests that the Agins formulation-that
government regulations substantially advance legitimate state interests-
may mandate a more stringent level of judicial review than afforded
under traditional substantive due process review. 177 The Court stated:
[O]ur opinions do not establish that [takings] standards are the
same as those applied to due process or equal protection claims.
To the contrary, our verbal formulations in the takings field
have generally been quite different. We have required that the
regulation "substantially advance" the legitimate state interest
sought to be achieved ... not that "the state 'could rationally
have decided' the measure adopted might achieve the State's
objective."
178
The dissent vigorously disagreed, arguing that the two tests have histori-
cally been co-extensive.179 It is unclear whether the comments in Nol-
lan's footnote three are intended to apply outside the particular subarea
of takings analysis at issue in the Nollan case. The comments are also
dicta, and arguably do more to pose the question than answer it. Never-
theless, they have been greeted as evidence in some circles that signifi-
cantly less deference will be afforded in the future to government
judgments as to what means are permissible for pursuing zoning
evidence of "malice, ill will or corrupt motive" or "egregious official behavior"), cert. denied,
483 U.S. 1021 (1987); Chiplin Enters. v. City of Lebanon, 712 F.2d 1524, 1527 (1st Cir. 1983)
("improperly motivated" denial insufficient; "additional factors might give rise to genuine con-
stitutional issues;" examples given include racial discrimination and retaliation for exercise of
first amendment rights).
173. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
174. Id. at 831.
175. Id. at 836-37.
176. Id. at 841-42.
177. Id. at 834-35 n.3.
178. Id. (citations omitted).
179. Id. at 843-44 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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objectives.18 °
It is too early to tell whether the dicta of Nollan's footnote three will
blossom into a new standard of review distinguishing takings and sub-
stantive due process claims. If this proves to be the case, governmental
agencies will likely be required to expend greater efforts justifying chal-
lenged land use regulations, including growth control restrictions, in fu-
ture litigation.
B. Procedural Differences Between Takings and Due Process Claims
Pleading a claim on a taking or substantive due process theory may
have significant procedural implications. The most important of these is
that future takings claims will almost always be relegated to state courts
due to the federal ripeness requirement. Other considerations beyond
forum shopping, such as availability of monetary damages and statutes of
limitations, may be significant strategic considerations. The following
sections summarize the more significant procedural differences between
takings and substantive due process claims.
1. Ripeness
Both takings and substantive due process challenges face a most for-
midable procedural obstacle in the "ripeness" doctrine set forth by the
Supreme Court in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v.
Hamilton Bank."' In Williamson County, the plaintiff developer spent
eight years attempting to secure approvals of subdivision plans. 82 Ulti-
mately, after a series of changes in the zoning regulations and revisions to
the plan, the plaintiff was unable to secure approvals for the desired den-
sity on part of the property. 3 The Supreme Court dismissed the plain-
tiff's takings claim as not ripe for review, citing the lack of any "final
decision" regarding the level of development to be allowed, and the fail-
ure of the plaintiff to first seek just compensation through available state
procedures.' 84 The plaintiff's substantive due process claim was simi-
larly dismissed as not ripe for lack of a "final decision."'85 The ripeness
requirements of Williamson County and subsequent Supreme Court
180. Id. at 834-35.
181. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
182. Id. at 176-82.
183. Id. at 181-82.
184. Id. at 186-96.
185. Id. at 199-200. The Court explained that resolution of the question depends on an
analysis of the effect of the Commission's application of the zoning ordinance on the property
and profit expectations. That effect cannot be measured until a final decision is made as to how
the regulations will be applied to respondent's property. Id.
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cases186 have, in the words of one federal appellate court, "erected impos-
ing barriers... to guard against the federal courts becoming the Grand
Mufti of local zoning boards." '187 Aside from its jurisdictional basis,
this doctrine serves the rather sensible purpose of preventing premature
litigation of cases involving only speculative future damages, rather than
concrete injuries to landowners.
a. state compensation remedies
Exhaustion of available state remedies is not ordinarily required in
actions brought in federal courts to enforce constitutional rights.188 The
requirement for exhaustion of state remedies in takings cases, however,
derives from the particular wording of the fifth amendment. As ex-
plained in Williamson County, "The Fifth Amendment does not pro-
scribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking without just
compensation." '89 From this, the Supreme Court has reasoned that "a
186. See, eg., MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
187. Hoehne v. County of San Benito, 870 F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1988). Cases addressing
the ripeness issues include: Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716 (1 1th Cir. 1990); East-Bibb
Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon Bibb Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 896 F.2d 1264 (1 1th
Cir. 1990); Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570 (1lth Cir. 1989); St. Clair v.
City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 109 S. Ct. 1557 (1989); Greene v. Town of
Blooming Grove, 879 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1989); Landmark Land Co. of Oklahoma v.
Buchanan, 874 F.2d 717 (10th Cir. 1989); Lake Nacimiento Ranch Co. v. County of San Luis
Obispo, 841 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 827 (1988); Unity Ventures v. County
of Lake, 841 F.2d 770 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Alter v. Schroeder, 488 U.S. 891
(1988); Lai v. City & County of Honolulu, 841 F.2d 301 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 994
(1988); Austin v. City & County of Honolulu, 840 F.2d 678 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
852 (1988); Shelter Creek Dev. Corp. v. City of Oxnard, 838 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 851 (1989); Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir.), modi-
fied, 857 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1090 (1989); Cassettari v. Nevada
County, Cal., 824 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1987); Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d 1449 (9th
Cir. 1987), modified on other grounds, 830 F.2d 968, cert denied, 484 U.S. 1043 (1988); Norco
Constr. v. King County, 801 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1986); McMillan v. Goleta Water Dist., 792
F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 906 (1987); Zilber v. Town of Moraga, 692 F.
Supp. 1195 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
188. Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 502 (1982). This general rule does not
apply uniformly to procedural due process claims. In such cases, the inadequacy of state pro-
cedures is an element of the claim itself. See id. at 505. However, a number of federal courts
have reasoned that, where adequate state legal remedies exist, the only process that is due is
provided by state law. See Huron Valley Hosp. v. City of Pontiac, 887 F.2d 710, 716 (6th Cir.
1989); Lake Nacimiento, 841 F.2d at 879-80 (procedural due process claims properly denied
due to adequate state remedy); Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1128 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 868 (1988); Chongris v. Board of Appeals of Andover, 811 F.2d 36, 40, 43 (1st Cir.)
(no procedural due process claim where revoked permits had been restored through state
court), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1021 (1987); Arroyo Vista Partners v. County of Santa Barbara,
732 F. Supp. 1046, 1050-51 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
189. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194.
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property owner has not suffered a violation of the just compensation
clause until the owner has unsuccessfully attempted to obtain just com-
pensation through the procedures provided by the State for obtaining
such compensation .... . 19o
The state remedies requirement only applies where state compensa-
tion procedures existed at the time of the taking.191 Since the Supreme
Court, in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles
County,192 declared money damages to be the constitutionally mandated
remedy for takings, g1 damages are now universally available in inverse
condemnation actions in state courts. The net effect of Williamson
County is thus effectively to require takings claims to be brought in state
courts..
The state compensation remedies requirement of Williamson County
does not apply to substantive due process claims. 194 Plaintiff landowners
desiring a federal forum may, therefore, be required to bring their claims
solely on a substantive due process theory. Some federal courts, how-
ever, have suggested that the availability of adequate state judicial reme-
dies may be a factor in determining whether alleged violations of
substantive due process are of sufficient magnitude to justify federal in-
tervention. The Seventh Circuit has stated that "in addition to showing
that the decision was arbitrary and irrational, the plaintiff must also
show either a separate constitutional violation or the inadequacy of state
law remedies." 195 The reasoning supporting this requirement is similar
to that applied in procedural due process cases-constitutional due pro-
cess requirements are satisfied if redress is fully available at the state
level.
b. final decision ripeness
The second major obstacle to litigation of takings and substantive
due process claims is the final decision requirement of Williamson
County.19 6 Unlike the state compensation doctrine, this requirement also
applies to substantive due process claims.
19 7
190. Id. at 195; accord Austin, 840 F.2d at 680-81; Cassettari, 824 F.2d at 737-38.
191. Lockary v. Kayfetz, 917 F.2d 1150, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 1990); Hoehne, 870 F.2d at 533-
34; Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 816 F.2d 1514, 1516-20 (11th Cir. 1987).
192. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
193. Id. at 316.
194. Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1989).
195. Polenz v. Parrott, 883 F.2d 551, 558-59 (7th Cir. 1989).
196. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 186.
197. Id. at 199-200; Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 857 F.2d 567, 569 (9th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1090 (1989); Unity Ventures, 841 F.2d at 775.
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The doctrine requires that the landowner make an actual attempt to
develop, or make other reasonable use of, the land under the existing
zoning regulations before challenging an alleged governmental failure to
permit reasonable use.198 The landowner must actually file at least one
"meaningful" development application and pursue the application to
some formal decision. 199 In addition, if any variances or other exceptions
to the regulations are available, the owner must apply for the variance
and receive a denial.2"e In takings claims, the rejection of a single large-
scale or "grandiose" development plan does not count as a "final deci-
sion. ' 20 1 In such cases, no basis exists for determining that reasonable
development will be denied. The landowner's remedy is simply to apply
for approval of less ambitious development plans, or seek changes in the
applicable regulations.2 "2 A single denial, however, may in some circum-
stances be ripe for review under a substantive due process theory.20 3
The cases have recognized that the reapplication requirement of
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo 2 may be excused
where further applications would clearly be futile.20 5 The Ninth Circuit,
which has issued by far the greatest number of opinions on ripeness is-
sues, has held that the futility exception may only be invoked where at
least one "meaningful" application has been filed and formally denied.20 6
While it is not clear whether other federal circuits will follow a strict
application of this rule, it is clear that the threshold requirements for
demonstrating the futility of pursuing normal application procedures are
high.20 7 At least one case has suggested in dicta that futility may be
established if the government's response to an application is unreasona-
bly delayed.20 8 It appears, however, that the period of delay would have
to be very substantial. In Norco Construction v. King County,2 9 the al-
198. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 187.
199. Id. at 187-88.
200. Id. at 188-90; Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. State Regional Planning Agency,
911 F.2d 1331, 1336-37 (9th Cir. 1990).
201. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 351, 352-53 n.8
(1986).
202. Id. at 352-53.
203. See, e.g., Herrington, 857 F.2d at 570.
204. 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
205. See, e.g., Tahoe Sierra, 911 F.2d at 1336-37; Hoehne, 870 F.2d at 534-35.
206. See, e.g., Kinzli, 818 F.2d at 1454-55.
207. See Landmark Land, 874 F.2d at 722; Unity Ventures, 841 F.2d at 776.
208. Norco Constr., 801 F.2d at 1145 ("[A] claim might also arise when it is clear beyond
peradventure that excessive delay in such a final determination has caused the present destruc-
tion of the property's beneficial use.").
209. 801 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1986).
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leged period of wrongful delay was five years.2 1° In McMillan v. Goleta
Water District,211 the case was not deemed ripe until eight years after a
moratorium was invoked.2 12  Similarly, in Williamson County, the
Supreme Court found the case unripe eight years after initial applications
were filed.213
Significantly, final decision ripeness requirements are deemed not to
apply to facial challenges. 21 '4 This is consistent with the theory of such
actions-that the mere enactment of the challenged regulation in and of
itself prohibits all possible economically viable use, or is an arbitrary and
unlawful exercise of police power.21 ' Nevertheless, the scope of such a
challenge is limited.21 '6  Ripeness considerations will preclude a facial
takings challenge if the effect on specific properties cannot be determined
from the face of the regulations.217 Similarly, where a plaintiff seeks to
challenge regulations on the grounds that they may be arbitrarily ap-
plied, the case is not ripe until the challenged provisions actually are
applied to the plaintiff.2"' A facial substantive due process challenge,
however, is normally ripe at the time of enactment, since the gravamen of
such a complaint is that the regulations themselves lack any valid
justification.219
Final decision ripeness requirements apply to both takings and sub-
stantive due process claims challenging the implementation of zoning
regulations. Nevertheless, the final decision requirement may have a
slightly different practical application to substantive due process claims.
Specifically, two federal courts have suggested that the reapplication re-
210. Id. at 1145-46.
211. 792 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 906 (1987).
212. Id. at 1457.
213. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 171-82, 186.
214. Smithfield Concerned Citizens for Fair Zoning v. Town of Smithfield, 907 F.2d 239,
242 (1990); Zilber, 692 F. Supp. at 1200-01.
215. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 199; Smithfield, 907 F.2d at 242-45.
216. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
217. See Pennel v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988) (plaintiff's taking claim premature
because plaintiff failed to avail himself of the provisions of ordinance permitting relief although
plaintiff's facial substantive due process challenge was ripe for consideration); Hodel v. Vir-
ginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 293-95 (1981) (reversing trial court
ruling that enactment of steep-slope provisions of Surface Mining Act effected a taking).
218. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 298-302 (court rejected challenge to enforcement provisions of Sur-
face Mining Act based on claims that procedures were inadequate and could be arbitrarily
applied).
219. Pennel, 485 U.S. at 8-9 (although plaintiff's taking claim premature because plaintiff
failed to avail himself of the provisions of the ordinance permitting relief, plaintiff's facial
substantive due process challenge was ripe for consideration); Smithfield, 907 F.2d at 242-44
(plaintiff need not apply for variance for zoning ordinance where alleging that ordinance itself
is irrational).
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quirement of MacDonald may apply differently to substantive due pro-
cess claims. 22 ° These courts reasoned that it is not always essential to
know the level of use that will ultimately be permitted in order to evalu-
ate whether a current development decision is irrational or unrelated to
any valid public objectives. 221 These cases are best understood for the
limited proposition that a final administrative decision may be subjected
to a form of facial challenge, where the only issue is whether the decision
was arbitrary and capricious or otherwise invalid. Where the substantive
due process claim is directed at the overall application of the regulatory
scheme to the landowner's property, the case is not ripe until all reason-
able possibilities of obtaining a constitutionally acceptable outcome have
been exhausted.222
Under all circumstances, a due process attack may not be made
against intermediate or interim decisions of local planning agencies. De-
nial of due process cannot be claimed if the plaintiff has "not exhausted
the process. ' 223 The Supreme Court has stated: "Before a federal court
may step in and ascertain whether a local planning authority has taken
property arbitrarily, however, it must allow the local authority a chance
to take final action. '224 At a minimum, there must be some final admin-
istrative decision to challenge.
c. application to growth control regulations
No published opinion has yet applied the ripeness requirements to a
challenge to growth control regulations.225 In growth control cases, the
ultimate level of development which may be permitted is not usually an
issue. The ultimate use is usually defined by general plans and zoning
ordinances. Most growth control regulations also require the applicant
to obtain necessary zoning, subdivision or development plan approvals
before getting in line for building permits, thus eliminating any dispute
about the permitted use of the land. The final decision which remains
open, however, is when development will be permitted.226
220. See Greenbriar, 881 F.2d at 1576 n. 11 (case ripe for review under due process theory
when record demonstrates that no more intensive development would be allowed); Herrington,
857 F.2d at 570.
221. Greenbriar, 881 F.2d at 1576 n.11, 1578-80; Herrington, 857 F.2d at 570.
222. See Williamson County, 105 U.S. at 186.
223. East-Bibb, 896 F.2d at 1266 (failure to pursue state law procedures).
224. Landmark Land, 874 F.2d at 722.
225. In Zilber v. Town ofMoraga, a federal district court applied the ripeness doctrine to
dismiss as applied takings and substantive due process claims against a development morato-
rium ordinance. 692 F. Supp. 1195, 1200-02, 1207 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
226. See Pardee Constr. Co. v. City of Camarillo, 37 Cal. 3d 465,470 n.6, 690 P.2d 701, 704
n.6, 208 Cal. Rptr. 228, 231 n.6 (1984) (distinguishing timing of development from traditional
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In some systems-those using a straight "first-come, first-serve" sys-
tem-the amount of delay may be ascertainable by relatively simple cal-
culation. The issue of whether the period of anticipated delay is sufficient
to violate constitutional standards thus would appear ripe for decision.
Other ripeness questions may remain, however, such as whether the
landowner has sought variances, exceptions or alternate development
plans which might provide for more expeditious development. The same
considerations should apply to growth management systems based on ge-
ographical phasing or phased development of infrastructure.
In merit ranking, lottery, or other systems involving annual alloca-
tions, ripeness is a major issue. Under such systems the denial of permits
during one allocation cycle cannot be equated with a final decision deny-
ing development. The applicant remains free to reapply during the next
cycle, until eventually permits are obtained. The reapplication require-
ments of MacDonald apply in these cases.
It is conceivable that repeated denials may eventually lead to a situa-
tion where the futility of pursuing further applications may be claimed,
either because the length of delay already has been excessive, or because,
as a practical matter, the criteria used by the system preclude issuance of
a development permit to that particular applicant. It is certainly desira-
ble to avoid situations in which one property owner has been singled out
to bear an excessive portion of the burden imposed by the growth man-
agement system. As previously indicated, however, the unreasonable de-
lay threshold for futility is long. In addition, quantifying damages in
such cases carries substantial practical difficulties because damages are
measured by the total length of delay. The Supreme Court's decisions
have indicated a steadfast refusal to adjudicate when regulations have
"gone too far" until it has been determined precisely how far the regula-
tions go.227
zoning restrictions for purposes of determining vested rights under growth control regula-
tions). It is, of course, possible to imagine hybrid cases, in which the landowner contends that
a taking results from a combination of overly restrictive use or density restrictions, and the
delaying effects of a growth management program. Waiting a very long time to build a very
small development may offend the constitution more than waiting a long time to build a large
one. However, the ripeness doctrine necessarily requires some final decision on the level of
permitted development, as well as timing.
227. MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 348. On the policy side, it can be said that it might be in the
local government's interest to learn earlier rather than later that the threshold of permissible
delay has been crossed, so that it may take corrective action before the damages for a tempo-
rary taking mount up. On the other hand, it is almost certain that allowing pre-final decision
claims will result in a proliferation of such suits. It is likely that many of these suits would be
commenced well before any level of delay that might be deemed a "taking" has occurred,
simply in the hopes of "getting the attention" of the local government and exerting pressure to
provide special treatment for the developer's project at the next allocation proceeding. Relaxa-
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2. Statutes of limitations
Procedurally, plaintiff developers or landowners face another bar-
rier-statutes of limitations. State court challenges to zoning and plan-
ning actions-at least those based on substantive due process grounds-
are typically governed by extremely short statutes of limitations.
228 If
these statutes apply, property owners may be faced with a swift choice
between challenging the validity of the ordinances or taking their
chances with the system.
On the other hand, statutes of limitations governing inverse con-
demnation claims may be considerably longer. For example, California's
statute of limitations is five years.229 It is unclear, however, whether
these longer limitations periods will control when the claim is based on a
specific zoning or permit decision, or whether the special statutes nor-
mally applicable to such actions will apply. Two California courts have
held that the special statutes governing challenges to permit decisions
controlled, and thus dismissed takings claims which were brought after
the applicable ninety-day limitations period. 30
Actions under section 1983,231 whether in state or federal courts, are
controlled by the statute of limitations generally applicable to tort cases
in the state where suit is brought.232 Statutes of limitations begin to run
under section 1983 when the plaintiff" 'knows or has reason to know'"
that a cause of action has accrued.233 In a facial challenge, this time
would appear to run from the date the challenged ordinance was
adopted, at least where public notice of the action was given. 34 Where
these time limits have passed, the plaintiff will generally be restricted to
an as applied challenge to the regulations.
The time limits in as-applied challenges will normally run from the
tion of the relatively bright-line final decision requirements may potentially create a situation
in which the administration of growth management programs is effectively controlled by legal
extortion. The principle losers in such a system would be those property owners who cannot
afford or choose not to hire litigation counsel.
228. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65009 (West 1991) (90 days).
229. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 318-319 (West 1982); see Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-
Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App. 3d 1602, 1608, 270 Cal. Rptr. 337, 340 (1990).
230. Rossco Holdings v. State of California, 212 Cal. App. 3d 642, 658-59, 260 Cal. Rptr.
736, 744-45 (1989); California Coastal Comm'n v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. App. 3d 1488,
1495-98, 258 Cal. Rptr. 567, 569-71 (1989).
231. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
232. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-71 (1985).
233. Norco Constr., 801 F.2d at 1145 (quoting Trotter v. International Longshoremen's &
Warehousemen's Union, 704 F.2d 1141, 1143 (9th Cir. 1983)).
234. See Barancik v. County of Marin, 872 F.2d 834, 835-36 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 242 (1989).
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time that a final decision has been reached.23 5 One federal court, how-
ever, has suggested that this time may be extended where the decision is
first challenged in state court, reasoning that the decision is not truly
final until the status of the property has been finally determined by the
state court2 3 6
3. Damages
a. takings
The fifth amendment demands that "just compensation" be the mea-
sure of damages for takings of private property.237 Just compensation is
generally measured by the fair market value of the property interests
taken or destroyed by the government.23 8 Where no means for establish-
ing a fair market value exist, however, other means for determining fair
and equitable compensation may be devised.23 9
For temporary takings, the kind which will normally be claimed in
the growth control context, the measure of just compensation is the value
of use during the period of taking, generally measured by fair market
rental value.24  Where the impermissible regulations diminished, but
did not destroy the value of land, damages may also be measured as in-
terest, or some other measure of return on the reduction in fair market
value of the property caused by the unlawful restriction.241
The damages recoverable under a takings theory are limited in a
number of respects. Just compensation is construed to require payment
solely for the value of property interests taken.242 Consequential dam-
ages-such as lost profits from anticipated sales or other lost opportuni-
ties; litigation costs, including attorneys' fees; and other incidental
damages, such as relocation costs or lost operating expenses-may not be
awarded absent some independent statutory basis for recovery.243 Nor is
235. See Norco Constr., 801 F.2d at 1145.46; McMillan, 792 F.2d at 1457.
236. Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 904 F.2d 585, 588 (1 1th Cir. 1990).
237. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
238. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379 (1945).
239. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 512, (1979).
240. Yuba Natural Resources v. United States, 904 F.2d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 319
(1987)).
241. Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 896 F.2d 1347, 1351 (11th Cir. 1987); Nemmers v.
City of Dubuque, 764 F.2d 502, 504-05 (8th Cir. 1985).
242. General Motors, 323 U.S. at 379.
243. Id. at 379-80; see also United States v. Bodcaw Co., 440 U.S. 202, 203-04 (1979) (attor-
neys' fees and other indirect costs); Yuba, 904 F.2d at 1581 (lost profits from mining property);
Hellenic Center v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 815 F.2d 982, 984 (4th Cir. 1987)
(cost of appraisal fees and other costs incurred in response to abandoned condemnation effort).
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the government required to pay compensation for any special values the
land may have to the owner, such as its suitability for a particular use or
other special circumstances. 2 "
Prevailing in a takings case may have one undesirable effect from
the property owner's perspective. If the entire property is deemed per-
manently "taken," then title logically must be forfeited to the govern-
ment. In the wake of First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles,24 however, most landowners will likely prefer to
seek damages for a temporary taking, and seek prospective relief through
invalidation of the offending regulations.
It is unclear whether state courts will award monetary damages in
all cases which arguably constitute takings under federal standards. His-
torically, a number of state courts held that, for policy reasons, damages
were simply not an available remedy in takings claims.246 In the wake of
First English, these cases clearly no longer bar recovery of damages
where the taking consists of an outright prohibition of use.247 The ques-
tion remains open as to whether state courts will find that damages are
available for takings premised on the reasonable relationship prong of
Agins v. Tiburon.24 The problem is one of labelling. Not all claims
which fall under the first Agins prong have been treated as takings by
state courts.249 The result is that some alleged takings claims may be
Litigation costs are recoverable by statute in most courts. In actions brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1988), attorneys' fees may often be recovered pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
244. 564.54 Acres, 441 U.S. at 511.
245. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
246. See, eg., Davis v. Puma County, 121 Ariz. 343, 345, 590 P.2d 459, 461 (1978), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 942 (1979); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 273, 598 P.2d 25, 28,
157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 375 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); DeMello v. Town of Plainville, 170
Conn. 675, 679-80, 368 A.2d 71, 74 (1976). For a further discussion of the damages remedy in
takings cases, see Gould, First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Ange-
les: Compensation for Temporary Takings, 48 LA. L. REv. 947, 954 (1988).
247. See First English, 482 U.S. at 321. First English unequivocally mandates payment of
monetary compensation only in cases where literally all use of the property has been denied.
At least one federal court has also held that damages are not constitutionally required where
the taking consists of imposition of unlawful permit conditions or restrictions while the prop-
erty retains some economically viable use. See Moore v. City of Costa Mesa, 886 F.2d 260,
263-64 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2588 (1990).
248. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 255 (1990); see
supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
249. See, eg., Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 329-30, 787 P.2d
907, 912 (taking occurs only where regulation infringes on "fundamental attribute of owner-
ship" or "goes beyond preventing a public harm and actually enhances a publicly owned right
in property," other constitutional violations must be treated as substantive due process claims),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 284 (1990).
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treated as substantive due process claims by state courts, which may, in
turn, drastically affect the availability of a damages remedy.
Moreover, most future takings litigation will likely occur in state
courts because of federal ripeness rules. Substantial uncertainty remains
as to whether damages will be available for all forms of alleged takings,
or whether this remedy will be reserved for a narrower class of regulatory
actions which result in near total destruction of property values.
b. substantive due process
In actions brought in federal courts under section 1983,250 damages
may be awarded for violations of substantive due process. The measure
of damages under a due process theory is more flexible than under tak-
ings jurisprudence. Under due process, damages need not be measured
by the fair market value of the affected property interest, but by the ac-
tual economic damage inflicted by the regulation.25' Unlike takings
cases, punitive damages may be awarded in due process cases involving
"evil motive or intent" or particularly egregious violations.25 2 As in
takings cases, however, merely speculative damages, including alleged
lost profits, may not be recovered.25 3 While the net results will often be
the same under a takings or substantive due process theory, substantially
greater or lesser awards may be available in individual cases, depending
upon the circumstances.
The availability of money damages for violations of substantive due
process is quite another matter in state courts. Some state courts have
expressly held that the remedy for violations of substantive due process is
simply invalidation of the.offending regulations.25 4 In other states, gov-
ernmental tort immunities, statutory or judicial, also may preclude dam-
ages awards.255 Unlike the takings clause of the fifth amendment, a
damages remedy is not specifically mandated by the due process clause of
either the fifth or fourteenth amendments, or their counterparts in most
250. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
251. See, eg., Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488, 1505 (9th Cir. 1988) (re-
versing excessive damages award and limiting damages to loss of return on increased property
value which would have accrued in absence of unlawful regulation), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1090 (1989).
252. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51 (1983); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S.
247, 268 (1981); Front Royal & Watten County Indus. Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal,
749 F. Supp. 1439, 1449 (W.D. Va. 1990).
253. Herrington, 834 F.2d at 1505 n.21.
254. Presbytery of Seattle, 114 Wash. 2d at 332, 787 P.2d at 913.
255. See, eg., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 818 (West 1980).
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state constitutions. 256 Thus, substantive due process claims may, in some
states, offer a viable damages remedy only if brought in federal courts, or
under federal civil rights statutes.
An in-depth examination of state laws is beyond the scope of this
Article. It should be clear, however, that the choice of pleading an ac-
tion as a takings claim or substantive due process claim may be gravely
affected by state law governing damages, as well as by the practical con-
siderations governing litigation in federal courts.
V. CONCLUSION
Growth control regulations are a valid and constitutionally permis-
sible exercise of the police power. A successful facial challenge to growth
control regulations is conceivable only in the unlikely case where
"growth control" regulations in fact amount to a long-term moratorium,
or are drafted in a manner which is truly irrational. The application of
growth control regulations also should not result in colorable takings or
due process violations, provided that the regulations do not prevent rea-
sonable use of affected lands for excessive periods. Constitutional attacks
can be avoided by ensuring that the public purposes served by the regula-
tions are clear and well-known; by avoiding interference with reasonable
alternate or interim uses of affected property whenever this can be done
consistent with the purposes for the regulations; and by ensuring that no
individual landowner is called upon, intentionally or otherwise, to bear
excessive delay in achieving some reasonable use of his or her land. The
constitution is not offended, however, if this use falls short of that de-
sired by the landowner, or is less than that which would be lawfully per-
mitted in the absence of growth control regulation.
Current law imposes significant procedural obstacles to litigation of
takings and substantive due process claims. The final decision ripeness
doctrine should bar claims by landowners who have either failed to make
genuine efforts to accommodate themselves to reasonable growth control
regulations, or whose injuries have simply not yet assumed constitutional
dimensions. Nevertheless, the ripeness doctrine also creates substantial
uncertainty as to just how much delay or arbitrary treatment a genuinely
aggrieved landowner must endure before seeking judicial relief. The po-
tential litigant also faces a bewildering variety of tactical considerations
in pursuing a takings or substantive due process case, including differing
ripeness requirements, statutes of limitations, availability of monetary
256. See CAL. CONsT. art I, § 7; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9; ILL. CoNsT. art I, § 2; N.Y.
CONST. art I, § 6.
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damages, and choices among federal or state court procedures and sub-
stantive law. These complexities may explain why there are few pub-
lished decisions applying takings and substantive due process analysis to
growth control regulations. They also explain why future attacks on
growth control regulation likely will rely on state constitutional or statu-
tory law rather than the federal constitution. Nevertheless, the economic
stakes are sufficient that future takings and substantive due process chal-
lenges can be expected, and case law on the subject likely will develop
accordingly.
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